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Abstract—Recent studies observe that app foreground is the
most striking component that influences the access control
decisions in mobile platform, as users tend to deny permission
requests lacking visible evidence. However, none of the existing
permission models provides a systematic approach that can au-
tomatically answer the question: Is the resource access indicated
by app foreground?
In this work, we present the design, implementation, and
evaluation of COSMOS, a context-aware mediation system that
bridges the semantic gap between foreground interaction and
background access, in order to protect system integrity and
user privacy. Specifically, COSMOS learns from a large set of
apps with similar functionalities and user interfaces to construct
generic models that detect the outliers at runtime. It can be
further customized to satisfy specific user privacy preference by
continuously evolving with user decisions. Experiments show that
COSMOS achieves both high precision and high recall in detecting
malicious requests. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of
COSMOS in capturing specific user preferences using the decisions
collected from 24 users and illustrate that COSMOS can be easily
deployed on smartphones as a real-time guard with a very low
performance overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile operating systems such as Android and iOS adopt
permission systems that allow users to grant or deny a per-
mission request when it is needed by an app for the first time.
But this approach does not provide sufficient protection as an
adversary can easily induce users to grant the permission first,
and then exploit the same resource for malicious purposes. A
recent user study [25] showed that at least 80% users would
have preferred to preventing at least one permission request
involved in the study and suggested the necessity of more fine-
grained control of permissions. Ideally, a permission system
should be able to identify suspicious permission requests on
the fly and automatically by taking user preferences into
account and notify users only when necessary. As shown in
several user studies [25], [26], [18], it is crucial to consider the
context pertinent to sensitive permission requests. Moreover,
a user’s preference is strongly correlated with the foreground
app and the visibility of the permission requesting app (i.e.,
whether the app is currently visible to the user). The intuition
is that users often rely on displayed information to infer the
purpose of a permission request and they tend to block requests
that are considered to be irrelevant to app’s functionalities [25].
Thus, a permission system that can properly identify and
utilize foreground data may significantly improve decision
accuracy and reduce user involvement. We posit that to fully
achieve contextual integrity [3], it is crucial to capture detailed
foreground information by inspecting who is requesting the
permission, when the request is initiated, and under what
circumstances it is initiated, in order to model the precise
context surrounding a request.
In this paper, we present the design and implementation
of a lightweight run-time permission control system named
COSMOS (COntext-Sensitive perMissiOn System). COSMOS
detects unexpected permission requests through examination
of contextual foreground data. For instance, a user interacting
with an SMS composing page would expect the app to ask
for the SEND_SMS permission once the sending button is
pushed, while an SMS message sent by a flashlight instance
is suspicious. Given a large number of popular apps with
similar functionalities and user interfaces (UIs), COSMOS is
able to learn a generic model that reflects the correspondences
between foreground user interface patterns (texts, layouts, etc.)
and their background behaviors.
However, such a one-size-fits-all model is not always suf-
ficient. In practice, different users may have very different
preferences on the same permission request even in a similar
context [26], [18]. Therefore, COSMOS then incrementally
trains the generic model on each device with its user’s pri-
vacy decisions made over time. In the end, each user has a
personalized model.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel permission system that inspects app
foreground information to enforce runtime contextual
integrity. Our approach involves a two-phase learning
framework to build a personalized model for each user.
• We implement a prototype of the COSMOS permission
system. It is implemented as a standalone app and can
be easily installed on Android devices with root access.
It is also completely transparent to third-party apps.
• We show that COSMOS achieves both high precision and
high recall (95%) for 6,560 requests from both authentic
apps and malware. Further, it is able to capture users’
specific privacy preferences with an acceptable median f-
measure (84.7%) for 1,272 decisions collected from users.
We also show COSMOS can be deployed on real devices
to provide real-time protection with a low overhead.
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Threat Model
We target threats from third-party apps that access unneces-
sary device resources in fulfilling their functionalities provided
to the users. Such threats come from both intended malicious
logic embedded in an app and vulnerable components of an
app that can be exploited by attackers. We assume that the un-
derlying operating system is trustworthy and uncompromised.
B. Design Goals
Our goal is to design a runtime permission system that
enforces contextual integrity with minimum user involvement.
Contextual Integrity: To enforce contextual integrity in mo-
bile platforms, one needs to ask the following three questions
regarding a permission request:
Who initiated the request? An app may request the same
permission for different purposes. For instance, a map app
may ask user’s locations for updating the map as well as for
advertisement. Although it can be difficult to know the exact
purpose of a permission request, it is critical to distinguish the
different purposes by tracing the sources of requests.
When did it happen? Ideally, a permission should be
requested only when it is needed, which implies that the
temporal pattern of permission requests is an important piece
of contextual data. For instance, it is helpful to know if a
permission is requested at the beginning or at the termination
of the current app activity and if it is triggered by proper user
interactions such as clicking, checking, etc.
What kind of environment? A proper understanding of the
overall theme or scenario when a permission is requested
is critical for proper permission control. For instance, it
is expected that different scenarios such as entertainment,
navigation, or message composing may request very different
permissions. In contrast to who and when that focus on detailed
behavioral patterns, what focuses on a high level understanding
of the context.
The above context will help us detect mismatches between
app behavior and user expectation. A research challenge here
is how to learn the context automatically for dynamic access
control. Moreover, as user expectation may vary from one to
another, how should we meet each user’s personal expectation?
Minimum User Effort: Recent studies on runtime permission
control focus on characterizing users’ behavioral habit and at-
tempt to mimic users’ decisions whenever possible [18], [25],
[26]. Although this approach caters to an individual user’s
privacy preference, it also raises some concerns. First, a user
could be less cautious and the potential poor decisions made
by the user could lead to poor access control [26]. Second,
malicious resource accesses are user independent (although
they may still be context dependent), which should be rejected
by the runtime permission system without notifying the user.
Furthermore, the permission system should automatically grant
the permissions required for the core functional logic indicated
by the context of the running app to reduce user intervention.
To achieve minimum user involvement, our system should
notify a user only when the decision is user dependent and
the current scenario is new to the user. In all other cases,
it should automatically accept or deny a permission request
based on the current model with the user’s previous decisions
incorporated.
Our system should also provide high scalability and adap-
tivity. It should scale to a large number of diverse permis-
sion requests and require no app source code or additional
developer effort. Its accuracy and usability can be continuously
improved with more user decisions incorporated.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 depicts the overall system architecture of COSMOS,
which contains two phases.
Offline Phase: The offline phase (details in Section IV) builds
a generic model to predicate user expectation when a sensitive
permission request is made. To build the model, we collect a
large number of benign apps and malicious apps and develop
a lightweight static analysis technique to extract the set of
sensitive API calls and the corresponding foreground windows.
Subsequently, the windows are dynamically rendered to extract
their layouts as well as the information of their embedded
widgets. The system calls, widgets and layouts are then used
to extract features to build learning models that classify each
sensitive API call of third-party apps as either legitimate,
illegal or user-dependent.
Online Phase: In the online phase (discussed in Section V),
the generic model trained previously is personalized as fol-
lows. For each sensitive API call invoked by a third-party app,
our mediation system will intercept the call and leverage the
personalized model to identify its nature (initially, the person-
alized model is the same as the generic model). The sensitive
API call is allowed if it is classified as legal and is blocked
(optionally with a pop-up warning window) if it is classified as
illegal. Otherwise, the API call is considered as undetermined
and the user will be notified for decision making. The user’s
decision is then fed back to the online learning model so that
automatic decisions can be made for similar scenarios in the
future. To better assist user’s decisions, detailed contextual
information is provided in addition to the sensitive API call
itself. Moreover, we provide specific mechanisms to handle
background requests without foreground context.
IV. OFFLINE ANALYSIS AND LEARNING
This section discusses the process of building a generic per-
mission model using program analysis and machine learning.
A. Foreground Data Extraction
COSMOS models the context of a sensitive request using
the foreground data associated with the request. Although one
can manually interact with an app and record the foreground
data, it is infeasible to build a faithful model by analyzing
a large number of apps manually. An alternative approach
is using existing random fuzzing techniques that generate
random inputs in order to trigger as many sensitive behaviors
as possible. However, random fuzzing is inefficient, as it
generates many inputs with similar program behavior. More
importantly, without any prior knowledge, random testing
Static 
Analysis
Dynamic 
Rendering
Feature 
Extraction Training
Feature
Extraction Inputrequest
offline
online
Fig. 1: System architecture
Listing 1: Code example
1 public class ComposeView {
2 public void onFinishInflate () {
3 ...
4 mButton = findViewById(R.id.compose button);
5 mButton.setOnClickListener ( this ) ;
6 ...
7 }
8
9 public void onClick(View v) {
10 ...
11 sendTextMessage (...) ;
12 ...
13 }
14 }
15
16 public class ComposeFragment {
17 public View onCreateView( ...) {
18 ...
19 mComposeView.setLabel(”Compose”);
20 ...
21 }
22 }
wastes time on exploiting code paths that are irrelevant to
sensitive resource accesses.
In this work, we propose a hybrid approach to collect
relevant foreground data, including the set of widgets, the
triggering events and the windows associated with sensitive
API calls. Our approach has two phases, a static analysis
phase and a dynamic rendering phase. In particular, we
adopt static program analysis to accurately locate the fore-
ground components that would trigger a permission request.
Compared with random fuzzing, our approach achieves bet-
ter coverage and eliminates redundant traces. The identified
foreground components are then rendered dynamically with
actual execution, which provides more complete and pre-
cise information compared to a pure static approach. As an
over-approximation approach, pure static analysis is criticized
by generating false relationships between UI elements [5].
Furthermore, we underline the fact that the existing hybrid
approaches [10] only focus on the program slices directly
related to sensitive invocations, which typically omit the code
corresponding to user interface.
To illustrate our hybrid approach, we use the code in
Listing 1 as an example throughout this section, which presents
the underlying logic of the open-source SMS app QKSMS.
Static Analysis: For each target app, we first identify its
permission-protected API calls through method signatures. We
construct a call graph for the given app with the help of
FlowDroid [1] and iterate over the graph to locate the
target calls. The list of permission-protected API methods
is provided in PScout [8] and FlowDroid. In QKSMS,
sendTextMessage in line 11 is marked as a sensitive API
caller that requests the SEND_SMS permission.
The set of call graph entry points of the sensitive API calls
are then identified by traversing through the call graph. For
instance, the onClick method inside ComposeView (line
8) is found as an entry method of sendTextMessage.
Further, the set of widgets that invoke the entry points (e.g,
mButton) are extracted by locating the event handlers of
the entry points. We then conduct a data flow analysis to
track the sources of the widgets. After knowing where the
widget mButton is initialized, we are able to get its unique
resource id (compose_button) within the app by inspecting
the initialization procedure (line 4).
As the foreground windows set context, our analysis goes
beyond individual widgets by further identifying the windows
that the widgets belong to. In our case, we aim to identify
the Activity that includes mButton. Since mButton is
initialized inside ComposeView, we search for the usage of
ComposeView within the app. ComposeView is declared
in ComposeFragment, from which we can finally identify
ComposeActivity as the window for mButton.
We notice that due to over-approximation, the static analysis
phase may misidentify some UI elements that are not corre-
lated with the indicated permission request. We manually filter
the misidentified samples before building the learning model to
lower the impact of false alarms as much as possible. However,
we remark that it can be beneficial to keep some contextual
instances that do not request a permission and label them as
illegal since they simulate more scenarios that should not use
the permission.
Dynamic Rendering: For each target Activity recognized
by our static analysis (e.g., ComposeActivity), we then
render it with actual execution to precisely extract its layout
and widget information. Actual execution enables us to extract
relevant data loaded at runtime. Capturing rendering informa-
tion specified by source code is intractable for static rendering
approaches such as SUPOR [14], which solely leverage app
resource files to uncover the layout hierarchies. For instance,
the title of the crafting page (Compose) of QKSMS, a critical
piece of context while using the app, is declared in the Java
code (line 19 in Listing 1) instead of the resource files. Losing
this kind of dynamically generated information may hinder the
progress of our upcoming task to precisely infer the purpose
of the underlying program behavior.
Most Activities cannot be directly called by default.
Hence, for each app, we automatically instrument the app
configuration file manifest.xml with a tag <android:
exported> and then repackage it into a new apk file.
After installing the new package, we wake up the interested
Activities one by one with the adb commands provided
by Android. Once an Activity is awakened, the contex-
tual foreground app data, including the layout and widget
information, is extracted and stored in XML files. For some
Activities that cannot be correctly started in this way,
we can manually interact with them. Advanced automatic UI
interaction is an active open research problem [5] and it goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Classification
Using the extracted foreground data, we are able to build
a machine learning model to detect user-unintended resource
accesses. Given a permission request, we consider it as :
Legitimate: if the permission is necessary to fulfill the core
functionality indicated by the corresponding foreground con-
text. The requests in this category would be directly allowed
by our runtime mediation system to eliminate unnecessary user
intervention. We emphasize that the core functionality here is
with respect to the running foreground context, not the app
as a whole. For example, some utility apps include a referral
feature for inviting friends to try the apps by sending SMS
messages. This is typically not a core functionality of the apps
and the developers normally do not mention this feature on
the apps’ description pages. However, the SMS messages sent
under the “invite friends” page after a user clicks the Invite
button should be considered as user intended. In contrast,
description-based approaches [19], [13] would unnecessarily
raise alarms.
Illegitimate: if the permission neither serves the core func-
tionality indicated by the foreground context nor provides
any utility gain to the user. An illegitimate request can be
triggered by either malicious code snippet or flawed program
logic. The latter can happen as developers sometimes require
needless permissions due to the misunderstanding of the
official development documents [8].
User-dependent: if the request does not confidently fall into
the above two categories; that is, it is not required by the core
functionality suggested by the foreground context, but the user
may obtain certain utility by allowing it. Intuitively, in addition
to the core functionality, the foreground context may also indi-
cate several minor features that require sensitive permissions.
Whether these additional features are desirable can be user
dependent. For example, besides the CAMERA permission, a
picture shooting instance may also ask permissions such as
ACCESS_LOCATION to add a geo-tag to photos. Although
some users may be open to embed their location information
into their photos that may be shared online later, those who
are more sensitive to location privacy may consider this a bad
practice. In this case, we treat ACCESS_LOCATION as a user-
dependent request and leave the decision to individual users.
Features: Before extracting features from the collected fore-
ground contextual data, we pre-process the crawled layouts
to better retrieve their structural properties. Mobile devices
have various resolutions. With absolute positions, models built
for one device may not apply to other devices with different
resolutions. Therefore, we divide a window into a 3× 3 grid
and map absolute positions to relative positions.
The processed layouts are then used to extract features.
We construct three feature sets to enforce contextual integrity
discussed in Section II. More specifically, we derive the
following features from a sensitive request:
Who: The static phase of our foreground data collection
described in Section IV-A allows us to identify the widgets
leading to sensitive API calls. We then collect the attribute
values of the target widgets using the dynamically extracted
layout files. It is possible that the permission request is
triggered by an Activity rather than a widget. In this case,
we would leave the value of this feature set as empty and rely
on the “what” feature set to handle windows.
When: The call graph traversal gives us entries of sensitive
API calls. An entry point can be either a lifecycle callback or
an event listener. The lifecycle models the transition between
states such as the creation, pause, resume and termination of
an app component. The event listeners monitor and respond to
runtime events. Both lifecycle callbacks and event listeners are
prior events happened before an API call and serve as useful
temporal context to the call. We therefore use the signatures
of entry methods as the “when” feature set.
What: The text shown on target widgets could be too generic
(such as Ok and Yes) to convey any meaningful context.
Therefore, we also derive features from the windows to help
infer the overall theme of the requesting environment. We
iterate over the view hierarchy of the window layout and
obtain all the related widgets with text labels. For every
such widget, we save the text on the widget and its relative
position in the window as features. Including both textual
and structural attributes provides better scalability to capture
semantic and structural similarities across millions of pages.
Although developers may adopt various design styles for
the same functionality, their implementations usually share a
similar characterization. For instance, we do not need to know
whether a window is implemented with Material design.
Instead, learning the title shown at the top of the window,
such as Compose and New message, is crucial.
By focusing on features directly visible to users, our ap-
proach is resilient to code level obfuscation. Note that the entry
methods are overridden of the existing official SDK APIs and
cannot be renamed by the third parties.
For each of the three feature sets mentioned above, we
generate a separate feature vector. Note that although attributes
of a widget leading to sensitive API calls appear in both the
“who” feature set and the “what” feature set, they are treated
separately to stress the triggering widget. For the “what” set,
the text and positions of all the widgets shown on the window
are included, while for the “who” set, only those related to
the triggering widget are included. All the textual features
are pre-processed using natural language processing (NLP)
techniques. In particular, we perform identifier splitting, stop-
word filtering, stemming and leverage bag-of-words model to
convert them into feature vectors. The process is similar to
other text-based learning methods [11]. In addition to the three
sets of features, it is possible to include more features to
further raise the bar of potential attacks.
Training: Using the three sets of features discussed above, we
train a one-size-fits-all learning model as follows. For each
permission type, a classifier is trained with a data mining
tool Weka [24] using the manually labeled sensitive API
calls related to that permission. The classifiers are trained
separately for different permissions to eliminate potential
interference. Each permission request is labeled as either legal
or illegal based on the foreground contextual data we collected
including: the entry point method signature, the screenshot
of the window, and the highlighted widget invoking the API
call (if there is such a widget). We ensure contextual integrity
by checking whether they altogether imply the sensitive API
call. The request is marked as illegal if it is not supported by
any type of the foreground data. For instance, a SEND_SMS
permission requested under the “Compose” page without user
interactions or required by an advertisement view is catego-
rized as illegal.
As we mentioned in Section II-B, our generic models will
be continuously updated at runtime to incorporate individual
user’s preferences. One option is to keep sending data to
a remote cloud for pruning the models. However, since the
content shown on a device can be deeply personal, transmitting
this kind of sensitive data out of the device would raise serious
concerns on potential leaks [9]. Consider the SMS composing
example again, the window may contain private information
typed by the user, which is inappropriate to share with a third-
party service. On the other hand, the limited computational
power of mobile devices makes it infeasible to repeatedly
train complicated models from scratch inside the devices.
To meet both the privacy and performance requirements, we
apply light-weight incremental classifiers that can be updated
instantaneously using new instances with a low overhead,
which matches the memory and computing constraints of
smart phones [28]. A key question is which incremental
learning technique to use. To this end, we have evaluated
popular incremental learning algorithms. The detailed results
are given in Section VI.
V. ONLINE PERMISSION SYSTEM
COSMOS as a mediation system dynamically intercepts sen-
sitive calls, collects features for them, and finally automatically
grants or denies the requests using online learning models.
A. Mediation and Data Extraction
Android does not officially allow a third-party app to
mediate other apps’ requests. Instead of modifying the OS
and flashing the new firmware, COSMOS is written in Java as a
standalone Android app and can be easily installed on Android
devices with root access. The implementation of COSMOS
is based on Xposed [22], an open-source method hooking
framework for Android. Xposed provides native support to
intercept method calls, which enables us to execute our code
before and after execution of the hooked method.
To detect improper permission requests at runtime, COSMOS
dynamically extracts information from the UI elements as-
sociated with sensitive calls. Consider the example shown
in Figure 2. The sendTextMessage is triggered after
clicking mButton shown on MainActivity. COSMOS
needs to retrieve the memory references of the interested
UI elements, including the running instances of mButton
and MainActivity. However, simply intercepting the target
sensitive call is insufficient. The problem is that although
we can extract the values of the variables appeared in the
current call (e.g., sendTextMessage), retrieving the values
from the prior calls (e.g., onClick) is currently infeasible in
Xposed, which makes it difficult to retrieve the trigger UI
instances by only hooking the sensitive API call.
To address the above problem, COSMOS intercepts
the invocations of both Activity lifecycle callbacks (e.g.,
Activity.onCreate) and event listeners (e.g., onClick)
in addition to sensitive API calls. For each of these methods, it
records the references of the method parameters. For instance,
in the above example, the references to mButton and the
Activity are stored when processing onClick(mButton).
When it encounters a sensitive API call, COSMOS retrieves
the latest widget and Activity it saved, and extracts the same
features from them as in the offline model. In particular, “who”
features are collected from the widget and “what” features are
extracted from the activity by iterating over all its widgets.
Moreover, COSMOS examines call stack traces to determine
the entry point methods leading to sensitive calls, which are
used to derive the “when” features.
After converting the features into numerical values,
COSMOS uses the online learning model to predict the type
of the sensitive request. It automatically grants the permission
if the request is classified to be legitimate with high confi-
dence and rejects the request if it is confidently classified as
illegitimate. For a rejected request, COSMOS further pops up
a warning to the user including the details of the request. A
request that is neither legal or illegal with high confidence will
be treated as user-dependent and will be handled by the user
preference module as discussed below.
As users can switch between Activities, a request may be
initiated by a background Activity. By tracking the memory
references of the associated UI elements, COSMOS is able to
reason about the background requests even if the associated
UI elements are currently invisible.
GUI Spoofing: To ensure that the foreground data is indeed
associated with the background request, COSMOS dynamically
MainActivity.onCreate()
MainActivity.onClick(mButton)
Open MainActivity
Click mButton
MainActivity
mButton
SmsManager.sendTextMessage(..)
Mediation
Call Stack
Fig. 2: Online extraction
Fig. 3: An example prompt shown by COSMOS. In the top right corner, the
Upload button that is accessing the location is highlighted.
inspects the widget information with the hook support and
ignores the widgets that are not owned by the permission
requesting app. Thus, COSMOS is resilient to GUI spoofing
that tries to evade detection by hiding behind the interfaces of
other apps.
More advanced GUI spoofing attacks have also been pro-
posed in the literature [4]. For example, when a benign app
running in the foreground expects a sensitive permission to be
granted, a malware may replicate and replace the window of
the benign app to elicit the user. However, such attacks can
be hard to implement in practice as they require Accessibility
feature enabled to the malware by the user. It is worth noting
that using Accessibility may play against the malware itself,
since Android repeatedly warns the user about the threats
caused by Accessibility. If needed, COSMOS can also intercept
the calls initiated from Accessibility to further alarm users.
Background Services: An Activity can start a background
Service. However, when a sensitive call is initiated by a
Service, its call stack does not contain the information of the
starting Activity. In this case, COSMOS monitors the calls of
Activity.startService(Intent) to track the rela-
tionship between running Activities and Services. COSMOS
then uses the information available from the Activity to infer
the purpose of a Service request.
A Service may exist without any triggering Activity. In this
case, COSMOS notifies the user about the background request
and lets the user decide whether to allow or deny the request.
Alternatively, we can always reject such requests. We argue
that sensitive services should not exist unless they provide
sufficient foreground clues to indicate their purposes. Users
tend to reject requests without foreground as suggested by
three recent user studies [25], [26], [18]. Indeed, the recent
updates of Android further restrict background services [12].
B. User Preference Modeling
To incorporate user preferences, COSMOS notifies the user
if the online model identifies a request as user-dependent.
Consider the example shown in Figure 3. The UI shows a
product review page and a location permission is requested
once the Upload button is clicked. On the one hand, the user
may be beneficial from sharing location if the seller provides
subsequent services to promote customer experience based on
the user’s review and location. On the other hand, the sharing
behavior could put the user at risk since there is no guarantee
how exactly the location information would be used by the app
developer. As the page does not provide enough evidences
whether location sharing is necessary, COSMOS treats the
instance as user-dependent, and then creates a prompt to accept
user decision. Our prompt not only alarms the user about the
existence of the permission request, but also highlights the
widget that triggered the request and the activation event.
The user decision, along with the features of the instance,
is then used to update our model. Discussed in Section IV-B,
our classifiers are built through incremental learning in order to
take care of both privacy concern and performance overhead.
The incremental learning model immediately accepts the new
instance and adjusts the decision strategy to better match user
criteria next time.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of COSMOS by
answering the following questions:
RQ1: Can COSMOS effectively identify misbehaviors (i.e.,
inconsistencies between context and request) in mobile apps?
How do the feature sets of who, when and what contribute to
the effectiveness of misbehavior identification?
RQ2: Can COSMOS be applied to capture personal privacy
preferences?
RQ3: Can COSMOS be deployed on real devices with a low
overhead?
RQ1 measures the effectiveness of the generic models where
individual user preferences are not involved. A request that
cannot be confidently labeled as either legal or illegal is
considered as user-dependent and its relavant effectiveness is
measured in RQ2.
A. RQ1: Accuracy in Identifying Misbehaviors
We manually labeled 6,560 identified permission requests
that belong to 1,844 different apps, each of them was either
a top-ranked app crawled across 25 categories from Google
Play, or a malware sample collected from VirusShare [23].
Each request was labeled through the associated foreground
contextual data, including the widget (if any), the events and
the window. In particular, we determined whether a request
TABLE I: Results for Different Classifiers
Algorithm MedianF-measure
Average
Precision
Average
Recall
HT 77.9% 81.7% 78.3%
NB 93.9% 93.3% 92.9%
SVM 95.5% 95.4% 95.4%
LR 96.1% 95.8% 95.5%
TABLE II: Results for Different Permissions
Permission Precision Recall F-Measure
DEVICE_ID 89.8% 89.3% 89.3%
LOCATION 93.8% 93.9% 93.8%
CAMERA 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
RECORD_AUDIO 96.0% 96.1% 96.1%
BLUETOOTH 97.9% 97.9% 97.9%
NFC 96.7% 96.6% 96.6%
SEND_SMS 99.8% 99.8% 99.8%
Fig. 4: The precision and recall of each participant.
TABLE III: Classification with Different Feature Sets
Feature Type Precision Recall F-Measure
Who 81.9% 78.8% 75.7%
When 69.7% 70.7% 70.0%
What 95.4% 95.3% 95.3%
Who & When 80.0% 79.1% 76.9%
Who & What 95.6% 95.6% 95.6%
When & What 95.6% 95.6% 95.6%
All 96.0% 96.1% 96.1%
(e.g., RECORD_AUDIO) was initiated by an appropriate wid-
get (e.g., a “microphone” button) after a proper interaction
(e.g., clicking) and under a correct environment (e.g., voice
assistant).
Overall Effectiveness: For each permission type, we lever-
aged the labeled requests both as training and test data in a
five-fold cross validation. Specifically, we randomly divided all
instances of the same permission into 5 equally sized buckets,
training on 4 of the buckets, and using the remaining bucket
for testing. We repeated the process 5 times and every bucket
was used exactly once as the testing data.
As our online learning approach is a continuous training
process that adapts to user decisions, a classifier that can
process one example at a time is desired. To determine
which machine learning technique to use, we evaluated the
effectiveness of four commonly used learning methods that
support incremental classification, including Hoeffding Tree,
(Multinomial) Naive Bayes, (linear) SVM and Logistic Regres-
sion. Compared to non-updatable classifiers, all these methods
can iteratively incorporate new user feedback to update their
knowledge and do not assume the availability of a sufficiently
large training set before the learning process can start [21].
A summary of the results is given in Table I, where the mean
values are calculated over all permission types. As we can
see, logistic regression achieved the best result among all four
classifiers. Table II further provides detailed results of logistic
regression on each permission type. We considered seven per-
missions that are highly security or privacy sensitive [18], [1]
and are commonly required by the collected apps. We observed
that among all the permission types, differentiating requests of
DEVICE_ID is more challenging since developers normally
do not provide sufficient information in apps to indicate why
the permission is requested. More human intervention could
be beneficial regarding DEVICE_ID.
Feature Comparison: To measure how each feature set con-
tributes to the effectiveness of behavior classification, we used
the same learning technique (e.g., logistic regression) with
different feature sets under “who”, “when” and “what” and
some combinations of them, respectively. The cross validation
results of RECORD_AUDIO are presented in Table III. Since
the comparison results of other permissions share the similar
trend, we omit them here.
For each feature set, we evaluated its effectiveness by
comparing the evaluation metrics of our learning models when
the feature set is used and when it is not. We found that the
“what” features contributed the most among the three feature
sets. As we mentioned in Section I, benign instances often
share similar themes that can be inferred from window content
and layout. For example, an audio recorder instance typically
has a title Recorder, a timer frame 00:00 at the center
and two buttons with words start and stop, respectively.
From these keywords and their positions in the page, COSMOS
is often able to tell whether the user is under a recording
theme. Although the “what” features successfully predicted
most audio recorder instances, it may be of limited use in
other cases where RECORD_AUDIO permission is used. For
instances, developers tend to integrate voice search into their
apps to better serve users. However, as the searching scenarios
differ greatly from each other, it is hard to classify their
intentions using “what” features only.
The “who” features help alleviate the above problem by fur-
ther examining the meta data of the corresponding widget. For
instance, co.uk.samsnyder.pa: id/speakButton is
an image button for speech recognition, which does not
provide useful “what” features as the image button does not
contain any extractable textual information. However, the word
“speak” in the resource-id clearly indicates the purpose of the
button. In addition to the textual data, the relative position
TABLE IV
Target App Requests/min CPU Time (%)
Wechat 12.6 4.4%
Yelp 5.8 2.2%
Yahoo Weather 2.5 1.4%
Amazon 0.8 0.6%
Paypal 0.4 0.2%
and the class attribute of a widget can also help locate non-
functional components, e.g., the advertisements at the bottom.
We observed that for RECORD_AUDIO, the “who” features
and the “when” features are highly correlated in most cases.
This is because most sensitive method calls initiated by
widgets are bound with the event onClick. However, there
are exceptions. For instance, a walkie talkie app that transfers
users’ audio information to each other has the tips Press
& Hold shown in its main window, which indicates that the
recording should start only after user clicking. However, it ac-
tually starts recording once the app is open. This misbehavior
can be effectively identified using the “when” features, which
emphasizes that apps should request a permission only after
proper user interactions.
In summary, “what” features work well in differentiating be-
tween most legitimate and illegitimate instances at the current
stage. However, as malware continues to evolve, we expect
that collecting more comprehensive contextual data including
“who”, “when” and “what” can provide better protection. The
last row in Table III shows that the combination of all the
three feature sets provides the best results.
B. RQ2: Effectiveness of Capturing Personal Preferences
We conducted a lab-based survey 1 to measure the effective-
ness of our models to capture individual user’s preferences,
where we asked participants to classify a set of requests that
were not faithfully labeled as legal or illegal. The survey was
composed and spread through Google Forms. Among the 24
participants, 3 were professors, 6 were undergraduate students
and 15 were graduate students. Each user is asked to classify
50 location accessing requests collected from 40 real apps,
covering several user-dependent scenarios such as shopping,
photo geo-tagging, news, personal assistant and product rating.
We collected 1,272 user decisions in total.
To simulate the real decision making on device, for each
request, the following information is displayed to the par-
ticipants: 1) Screenshot: the screenshot taken from the app
right after the request was initiated, with the triggering widget
highlighted. 2) Prior event: the event led to the request, such as
app start and user clicking. 3) Meta-information: the app name
and a Google Play link are included, whereby the participants
can find more information.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our user preference model-
ing by updating the pre-trained model constructed during the
evaluation phase of RQ1 with the decisions collected from
each individual user. For each user’s decisions, we randomly
partitioned them into three sets and used two of the three sets
as the training set to update the pre-trained model, and the rest
1Our user study was proceeded with Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval.
set as the testing set. Our model yielded a median f-measure
of 84.7% among the 24 users, which is reasonably good due
to the limited number of samples. We expect our model to be
more accurate with more user feedback in the future.
Figure 4 presents the detailed result of each individual. We
observed that some results were close and even identical, lead-
ing to the overlapping dots shown on the diagram. A quarter of
users’ results have more than 90% precision and 90% recall.
Our model performed surprisingly well for one individual,
with 100% precision and 100% recall. One individual tends to
behave conservatively by rejecting nearly all requests, giving a
sharp outlier in the lower right corner with a perfect precision
but a terrible recall. We also observed that some users made
inconsistent decisions under a similar context. For instance,
one user allowed a request from a product rating page but
rejected another with a closely related context. One possible
explanation is that sometimes users are less cautious and
make random decisions as suggested in [26]. Fortunately, our
system can greatly help protect users from malicious behaviors
caused by malware even if users make random decisions, since
our generic model has already learned many misbehaviors in
offline training.
We also conducted a controlled experiment to test whether
the fine-grained contextual info shown in our prompts can
help users make better decisions. We used the screenshots
with location-based functionality at the center and a behavioral
advertisement at the bottom. Without prompts, 79.2% of the
participants chose to grant the permission. After being alerted
that the location requests were actually initiated by adver-
tisements, 73.9% of them changed their minds to reject the
requests. These results encourage the deployment of COSMOS
to better assist users against unintended requests.
C. RQ3: Performance Measurements
To investigate the performance overhead incurred by
COSMOS, we installed five selected representative apps col-
lected from different categories, including Wechat, Yelp,
Yahoo Weather, Amazon and Paypal, on Nexus 5 with
COSMOS deployed. We then interacted with them as in com-
mon daily use, and monitored the overhead introduced by
COSMOS. Shown in Table IV, COSMOS consumed 1.8% total
CPU time on average and less than 5% total CPU time for all
the monitored apps. We also measured other impacts related
to the performance such as memory and storage overhead, and
all the values were reasonably small for daily use. Details are
omitted due to the page limit.
VII. RELATED WORK
Early studies on building context-aware systems mainly
depend on manually crafted policies specific to certain behav-
iors [6], [17], [29]. Recent approaches attempt to infer context-
aware policies from users’ behavioral traits [25], [26], [18].
They observe that the visibility of apps is the most crucial fac-
tor that contributes to users’ decisions on permission control.
However, they do not capture more fine-grained foreground
information beyond visibility and package names.
Some recent efforts have also been made to detect
unexpected app behavior from UI data. For instance,
AppIntent [27] uses symbolic execution to extract a se-
quence of GUI manipulations leading to data transmissions.
PERUIM [16] relates user interface with permission requests
through program analysis. Both approaches require user efforts
to locate suspicious behaviors. AsDroid [15] identifies the
mismatch between UI and program behavior with heuristic
rules. DroidJust [7] tracks the sensitive data flows to see
whether they are eventually consumed by any human sensible
API calls. Ringer et al. [20] design a GUI library for Android
to regulate resource access initiated by UI elements. As these
approaches rely on a small set of human crafted policies, they
can only recognize certain misbehaviors within the domains.
Most recently, machine learning has been used to auto-
mate the analysis of user interface. FlowIntent [11] and
Backstage [2] detect behavioral anomalies by examining
all textual information shown on the foreground windows with
supervised learning and unsupervised learning, respectively.
Though similar in spirit, they touch upon a subset of the
challenges that COSMOS tries to address and only focus on
static app auditing. We extend this line of research in several
ways. First, we propose to protect contextual integrity through
analyzing UI data from three distinctive perspectives: who,
when and what. Second, we provide a two-layer machine
learning framework that can automatically grant the necessary
permission requests and reject the harmful requests without
requiring user involvement, as well as improving the decision
accuracy based on user feedback. Third, we implement our
system on real devices to provide runtime protection and
conduct comprehensive evaluations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We propose a context-sensitive permission system called
COSMOS that automatically detects semantic mismatches be-
tween foreground interface and background behavior of run-
ning mobile applications. Our evaluation shows that COSMOS
can effectively detect malicious resource accesses with high
precision and high recall. We further show that COSMOS is
capable of capturing users’ specific privacy preferences and
can be installed on Android devices to provide real-time
protection with a very low performance overhead.
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